

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

649-EBP

62-116395-649

4
ENCL. 16

EWL:glw 9/8/75

The ~~Attorney~~
ATTORNEY
GENERAL

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Rememo Shaheen to Mintz capt'd "Special Procedures for Processing SSC Requests Relating to Mail Surveillances," dated 8/8/75. Encl'd is memo for forwarding to SSC which responds to request originally set forth as Item 4, Appendix B, of 5/14/75 SSC request & later amplified in let from Mr. Elliff 6/13/75. Memos & documentation requested in (3) of 6/13/75 let are being delivered w/this communication. Also encl'd for ur records is copy of memo prepared for SSC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2AUN/ly

62-116395-649

273-10070

Chubb

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/02 BY SP2ALM/elj

DIRECTOR, FBI

5/19/66

SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (C)

CSSE 2641-S*
CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE - (CH)
Bufile 134-12035
SF File 134-2596

CSSE 2670-S*
CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE - (CH)
Bufile 134-12512
SF File 134-2725

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/10 BY SPAN/ldj

Re San Francisco airtel to Bureau dated 1/24/66.

Contact with above sources was temporarily discontinued on 1/24/66 for security reasons involving local changes in postal personnel.

Current inquiry reveals that, while the physical plant and postal schedules are unchanged from period of prior contact with sources, the security risk remains.

While it is realized these sources furnished valuable information to the Federal Government, it is not believed the value justifies the risk involved. It is not recommended that contact with sources be re-established.

4 - Bureau (AM-RM)
(2 - 134-12035)
(2 - 134-12512)
2 - San Francisco
(1 - 134-2596)
(1 - 134-2725)

RES/cmp
(6)

NOT RECORDED

MAY 23 1966

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : W. C. Sullivan

~~Mr. Belmont~~
1 - Mr. Sullivan

DATE: 5/22/64

FROM : W. R. Wannall

1 - F. R. Wannall
1 - H. J. Jaquiss
1 - V. E. Ruehl

SUBJECT: CHICLET

CSSF 2670-S*
CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE
INTERNAL SECURITY - CHINA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP1ALM/dj

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This is the first evaluation of captioned program.

ORIGIN: On 1/8/64 San Francisco developed CSSF 2670-S* a highly sensitive source, whereby we have access to communications from U. S. destined for Hong Kong and Communist China. This operation is handled under code word Chiclet. Most of the information is in Chinese and translations are handled by FBI Laboratory. Translations are furnished San Francisco which in turn paraphrases data and disseminates to interested field offices. PURPOSE: Program is designed to identify individuals in U. S. who because of contacts with individuals in Communist China constitute possible threat to U. S. SCOPE: Program is field wide, however, most investigations are conducted by offices covering large Chinese populations. TIE IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS: Information emanating from this source reaches all areas of Chinese investigations.

CASE LOAD: Thirty-eight cases are presently in pending status. Ten cases have been closed since 1/8/64. COST: Source is not paid and investigations resulting from this program are absorbed by agents currently handling security matters. PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESSES: Source operates on secure basis. San Francisco is aware if security becomes an issue Bureau is to be advised immediately and operation discontinued until security can be guaranteed. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL: San Francisco furnishes other divisions with information obtained from this operation and furnishes instructions for handling an investigation. San Francisco has responsibility for deciding security classification to be placed on information furnished by source. Bureau is advised of results of all inquiries resulting from this operation. ADEQUACIES AND CURRENTNESS: INSTRUCTIONS: Instructions regarding material furnished by source are current and adequate.

OVER-ALL VALUE: Source makes available large volume of valuable information not otherwise available. It has identified twenty individuals in U. S. subscribers to "Peking Review," a Chinese Communist-English-language magazine and numerous subscribers to other Chinese publications. Source

Enclosure
134-12512

VER: gew

62 JUN 5 1964

REC-11

8 MAY 28 1964

Classified by 6283 10/17/70
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to W. C. Sullivan

RE: CHICLET

CSSF 2670-S*

134-12512

identified 148 persons dealing with China Books and Periodicals, a bookstore owned and operated by Communist Party member in San Francisco registered with Department as agent of Communist China. Source furnished information regarding number of instances of collection of scientific and technical data from U. S. by Communist China. Source disclosed a Chinese in Communist China, former U. S. student, University of Purdue, for first time in twelve years contacted former classmate, an employee of Radio Corporation of America with access to classified information. In addition, source furnished data regarding fifteen individuals currently under investigation. Source also obtained identity of approximately sixty individuals in Brazil subscribers to Chinese Communist propaganda magazine. OPERATION OF SOURCE: Agents who handle Chiprop, another sensitive operation whereby we have access to mail emanating from Communist China destined for individuals in U. S., handle captioned operation. Translations of Chinese language material furnished by source are reviewed at Bureau and names are searched for main files and/or espionage references. Because of lack of identifying data no other references are reviewed as further investigation, if required, will disclose background data facilitating more thorough search of Bureau records. Espionage references are reviewed even though it may not be possible to make an immediate identification as such data may be important for consideration by field.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. If you approve source will be evaluated annually and memorandum submitted each May 15, at which time careful consideration will be given to productivity and adequacies of administrative control.

2. Attached for approval is letter to San Francisco instructing Chiclet operation continue to be handled under same administrative controls which apply to Chiprop. In order that Bureau may periodically evaluate Chiclet and insure that its continued operation is justified, San Francisco will be instructed to furnish summary of significant accomplishments for prior six-month period to reach Bureau April 15, and October 15.

76R

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Belmont
Mr. Sullivan
W. R. Wannall
H. J. Jaquiss
V. E. Ruehl

SAC, San Francisco (134-2725)

5/25/64

REC-11
Director, FBI (134-12512)

~~SECRET~~

CSST 2670-S*

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE

INTERNAL SECURITY - CHINA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/00 BY [signature]

Reurlet 4/29/64.

Bureau authority granted to continue operation captioned source. You are instructed to apply same administrative control and handling to information received from captioned source as that which is applicable to CSST 2641-S*.

In addition, in order that Bureau may periodically evaluate captioned source and insure that its continued operation is justified furnish summary of significant accomplishments for past six-month period to reach Bureau by 4/15 and 10/15. Bureau recognizes that investigation by other offices may result in accomplishments of which you may not be cognizant and in those instances, of course, you will not be responsible for furnishing information other than that which is available to you as the initial recipient. You should, of course, submit at any time suggestions or recommendations you may have for improved handling of source. You will also have the obligation and responsibility of immediately notifying Bureau in event security of source becomes an issue.

VER:gew

(8) [signature]

NOTE:

See cover memorandum W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, dated 5/22/64, same caption, prepared by VER:gew.

MAILED 2

MAY 25 1964

COMM-FBI

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Classified by 6283
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 + 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~SECRET~~

SF 134-2725
RES/lr

~~SECRET~~

["Minzu Huabao," (National Minorities pictorial).]

["Wen Wu," Chicom newspaper printed in Hong Kong.]

["Evergreen," pro-Chinese Communist youth magazine.]

D. China Books and Periodicals (CBP), Bufile 105-88873

In 2/64, 45 persons were identified as subscribing or renewing subscriptions to various [Chicom] publications through [GUOZI SHUDIAN (International Book Store)] handled by CBP, a registered foreign agent. In 3/64, 103 persons were so identified. Financial data re [CBP] and [GUOZI SHUDIAN] obtained.

E. Miscellaneous Requests

Individuals requesting various [Chicom] publications, etc., identified.

II. [Chicom] Collection of Scientific Data From United States

A number of instances of collection of scientific and technical data have been reported. A list of 52 publications sent to [WAIWEN SHUDIAN] from the [Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, Washington, D. C.] was obtained. Exchange of data between [Professor EDGAR F. WESTRUM, JR., University of Michigan,] and [Dr. CHOU CHIEN, American-educated Chinese now in Peking,] reported. Contact of [RCA] employee by former [Purdue University] classmate after 12 years reported. Classmate is American-educated [Chinese] now a member of [Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in China]. The dispatch of mechanical engineering journals to [China] was also reported.

III. Data Concerning Subjects Under Investigation

Source has furnished information concerning the following Subjects of Bureau investigations:

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFO
[REDACTED], who has been identified as a [Chicom] intelligence agent operating in the US; [REDACTED]

[ROBERT CHARLES FRIEND (Bureau file 100-393066).]

~~SECRET~~

SF 134-2725
RES/lr

~~SECRET~~

WILLIAM THOMAS VILA (Bureau file 100-405501), New York Office Security Index subject, editor of "Marxist-Leninist Vanguard," change of address obtained.

CHARLES TAYLOR ADAMS (Bureau file 105-64427), distributor of ANNA L. STRONG Newsletter.

BERNARD F. KOROTZER (Bureau file 100-426872) and wife (Bureau file 100-435479).

DOROTHY FISCHER CHENG (Bureau file 100-380306) traveled abroad and identity of relatives.

SIDNEY SHAPIRO (Bureau file 100-39229), activities and relatives.

ISIDORE NEEDLEMAN (Bureau file 100-341652).

JACK ROVINSKY, aka STANLEY BENDER (Bureau file 100-341652).

ESTHER TANNEBAUM, mother of GERALD TANNEBAUM (Bureau file 105-36074); she departed U.S. 3/20/64 for Hong Kong.

SUSAN RATHBONE (Mrs. FRANK RATHBONE) sister of principals in Sun Ring, relatives identified.

JAMES CHAO (Bureau file 105-65268)

SCOTT NEARING (Bureau file 100-16842) and wife; data re travel abroad.

BRADFORD J. LYTTLE (Bureau file 105-121706), National Secretary of Committee for Non-violent Action, requested printed matter, films, etc.

LORENZO LO (Bureau file 105-119807) activities and sympathies.

CHANG Kai-shek, details of scheme to extort large sums from leader of Nationalist China revealed.

- 3 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

IV. Chinese Communist Sympathies in United States

Numerous persons residing in United States who have expressed sympathy for Chinese Communists have been identified.

V. Chinese Communist Sympathizers Abroad

Set out below is data reflecting Chinese Communist interest or sympathy in certain Central and South American countries as reported by source:

Brazil

"China Reconstructs," about 50 subscribers identified.

"China Illustrated," 8 subscribers identified.

"China Pictorial" 2 members of Legislative Assembly identified as subscribers.

British Guiana

"Progressive Youth Organization" in Georgetown accepted invitation to send delegation to visit China.

Contact of JACOB ROVINSKY, aka (above) identified.

Colombia

"China Pictorial" 3 subscribers identified.

Chinese Communist sympathizers identified.

Bolivia, Uruguay, Panama

Chinese Communist sympathizers identified.

Peru

Chinese Communist sympathizers identified who attended Conference of Peoples in Havana, Cuba.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : W. C. Sullivan

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: COMMUNICATIONS FROM UNITED STATES
TO HONG KONG AND COMMUNIST CHINA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CHINA

DATE: 11/20/63

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan1 - C.F. Downing
1 - Wannall
1 - Ruehl

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP7 RML/dj

San Francisco is in a position to apply [Sam Survey] technique to mail destined for [Communist China]. [Sam Survey] is New York program whereby outgoing airmail to selected [European] countries is examined to detect illegal [Soviet-bloc] agents.

Airmail to [Hong Kong and Communist China] exits U. S. through San Francisco, thus coverage at San Francisco would amount to national coverage. Survey by San Francisco disclosed this coverage will involve approximately four Special Agents utilized full time on six-day workweek. A secure space is available for processing the mail.

New York originally tested [Sam Survey] for period of two months on very limited amount of mail which was destined for [Communist China]. New York picked up eight items indicating such strong [pro-Chinese Communist] sentiments that further investigation was warranted. These cases are still pending. New York can furnish San Francisco with Watch List to facilitate screening mail.

We know U. S. is prime target of [Chinese Communist] intelligence. Investigation of [redacted] disclosed they may be working in U. S. for [Chinese Communists]. [Gus Hall, Communist Party (CP) USA, suspects [redacted] of being [Chinese Communist] agent. In September, 1963, [redacted] made a hurried trip to [London].

(FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFO)

[redacted] advised that [redacted] on recent visit to [London] was in contact with [redacted] and appears to be engaged in [Chinese Communist] intelligence operation re [Sino-Soviet] dispute. [redacted] reportedly maintained close liaison with [redacted] reported [redacted] is in contact with individuals in [Communist China].

In 1962, a [Chinese Communist] defected from [Chinese Communist] Embassy, [Stockholm, Sweden]. The defector stated on more than one occasion, registered mail from U. S. was received at [Chinese Communist] Embassy and was immediately turned over to Military Attache. Defector had no knowledge

Classified by 6283

Exempt from GDS, Category 2+3

DEC 4 1963

VER: pdb: bld

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum Wannall to Sullivan
Re: COMMUNICATIONS FROM UNITED STATES
TO HONG KONG AND COMMUNIST CHINA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CHINA

of contents nor was he permitted to examine mail to identify sender. Mail was handled with maximum security. CIA to date has not been able to furnish any additional data concerning this mail.

While it is recognized proposed coverage necessitates use of unusual amount of manpower, its potential to penetrate Chinese Communist intelligence activities in U. S. requires exploration. If successful, program will more than justify use of contemplated manpower.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved, San Francisco will be instructed to promptly place in effect coverage of mail destined for Hong Kong and Communist China for period of three months. At end of three months San Francisco will submit recommendations re continuation.

JEK
W
W.C. 6/11/54
W.C. 4/7
G.S. V

W. C. Sullivan

6/28/63

W. R. Wannall

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan
1 - Wannall
1 - Mossburg
1 - Jaquiss
1 - Ruchl

CHIPPROP.

CSST 2270-3*

INTERNAL SECURITY - [CHINA]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2ALM/ly

Captioned source has been replaced by CSST 2241-3*.
Latter source will have access to all material previously furnished
by CSST 2270-3*.

CSST 2270-3* developed by San Francisco Office on 8/1/56.
This source has had access to data regarding contacts between
persons in Communist China and Hong Kong with persons in the
United States. Part of information furnished was in Chinese language
and translations handled by FBI Laboratory. This source was
operated to identify individuals in United States who because of
their contact with individuals in Communist China constituted
a possible threat to internal security of United States.

Upon receipt of translations from FBI Laboratory,
San Francisco furnished other divisions with information obtained
from source together with Bureau-approved instructions for handling
an investigation. Bureau was advised of results of all investigations
resulting from this operation and program was examined annually at
Seat of Government to determine security and whether any administrative
changes were necessary.

Source made available a tremendous amount of information
regarding conditions in Communist China and provided a picture of
economic and social conditions not otherwise available. As a result
Bureau was in a position to establish reaction of Chinese Communist
people to various policies and programs formulated by Chinese Communist
Government. We also identified Chinese who had been educated in
United States and subsequently returned to Communist China and were
able to identify type of work in which these individuals were engaged.
The source provided names of individuals other than Chinese traveling
in Communist China. Such information is of particular interest when
it involves United States citizens or permanent resident aliens of
United States. We also identified scientists in United States in
contact with scientists in Communist China. This disclosed particular
areas of scientific research concerning which Chinese Communists
are endeavoring to obtain data.

Enclosure

134-5103

1 - 100-954034 (CHIPPROP)

1 - 134-12615 (CSST 2241-3*)

NOT RECORDED
170 JUL 11 1963

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Memorandum Kennell to Sullivan

Re: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CSRF 2273-S*
134-5133

San Francisco Agents handling this operation processed approximately 13,000 items per day from which they extracted approximately 100 items for consideration and possible action. By airtel 4/28/68 San Francisco advised Restricted Merchandise Unit, U.S. Customs, San Francisco, had been removed from Old Customs House and placed in another locality. Operation of ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CSRF 2273-S* depended upon the Restricted Merchandise Unit being located in Old Customs House. As a result ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CSRF 2273-S* became inoperative.

San Francisco thereafter made continued efforts to reactivate ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CSRF 2273-S* without success. By airtel dated 6/12/68 San Francisco advised it had been successful in establishing another anonymous source, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CSRF 2341-S*, which is capable of furnishing information pertaining not only to Communist China but other Asian and European countries as well. Full security in contacting the new source is assured. By letter dated 6/23/68, San Francisco advised ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CSRF 2341-S* has replaced ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CSRF 2273-S*.

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached is letter for San Francisco instructing same administrative procedures are to be adhered to in operation of ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CSRF 2341-S* as were observed in operation of ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CSRF 2273-S*.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI

Date: 5/25/65

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL - REGISTERED
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [134-12035] ATTENTION: FBI LABORATORY

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO [134-2596] (P)

[CSSF 2641-S*]

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE - [CH]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2ALM/chj

As of May 26, 1965, contact with Source will be temporarily suspended in view of discontinuance of Post Office examination of first-class mail originating in Hong Kong and Mainland China as a result of the Supreme Court decision of May 24, 1965.

Bureau will be promptly advised when arrangements have been perfected to recontact this Source.

3 - Bureau (AM - RM)

1 - San Francisco

RES:lg

(4)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 1167 on 10/8/75

Classified by 6233

Exempt from GDS, Category 2-3

Date of Declassification Indefinite

REC-42

1 MAY 27 1965

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M

Per _____

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Anderson

SAC, San Francisco

1-18-66

Director, FBI

[CSSF 2641-S*]
CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE - [CH]
BUFILE 134-12325
SAN FRANCISCO FILE 134-2596

✓ [CSSF 2670-S*]
CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE - [CH]
BUFILE 134-12312
SAN FRANCISCO FILE 134-2725

ReSFlet 1-5-66.

Promptly submit separate justification letters in accordance with established procedures concerning [CSSF 2641-S*] and [CSSF 2670-S*].

LLA:wlg
(6)

NOTE: Above-mentioned sources furnish information concerning communications from U.S. destined for [Hong Kong and Communist China] [CSSF 2670-S*, Chiclet] and as well as data concerning contact between persons in [Communist China and Hong Kong] and persons in the U.S. [CSSF 2641-S*, Chiprop]. These sources were instituted 7-14-65 under our current program. They were temporarily discontinued 12-7-65 due to rush of holiday season and re-established 1-3-66. Justification letters are due concerning these sources.

DUPLICATE YELLOW

~~SECRET~~

Chuan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY 60321 JAL/STP

SAC, San Francisco (134-1937)

Director, FBI (134-9844) - 2

1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. Downing
1 - Mr. Ruchl
February 28, 1961

CS SF 2471-S*
IS - CH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY 224M/ely

Reurlet 2-13-61.

Careful consideration has been given to recommendations furnished by you in relet with regard to captioned subject. The Bureau has decided that it is not warranted at this time to expand our present coverage to include all available contacts among the Chinese in Canada and U. S.

The volume of translation resulting from such additional coverage would necessitate Bureau employing at least one more full-time Chinese translator. Such an expense cannot be justified based on results of this coverage to date. Bureau has reviewed 83 items submitted by your office furnished by captioned source and translated by Chinese-language Bureau translators. Of these, 79 were merely contacts among Chinese in Canada and Chinese in U. S. exchanging personal news. The remaining four included letters from individuals in Communist China to Chinese in U. S. However, these, too, were devoted to personal information.

The Bureau has no objection to your using this source in obtaining information in specific cases such as the ones cited in relet nor will the Bureau object to translating items available to this source which you consider should be translated in order that the best interests of the Bureau may be served. However, when submitting items for translation, other than those relating to specific cases, set forth in the cover communication reasons for submitting such items for translation.

You indicated in relet that you believe Chinese Communists send propaganda into U. S. via Canada in order to circumvent U. S. regulations regarding such propaganda. Based on this assumption, you further conclude that this line of communication will be used for espionage communications. In the event you receive positive indications of such espionage

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Tele. Room _____
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Gandy _____

VER:ms

(6)
MAR 1 1961

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

Date of Declassification Indefinite

Exempt from GDS, Category

Exempt from GDS, Category

Date of Declassification Indefinite

Letter to SAC, San Francisco

Re: CS SF 2471-S*

134-9844

communications furnish Bureau complete details and consideration will be given to expanding coverage available through captioned source. Do not initiate such general coverage without first obtaining specific Bureau authority.

NOTE: CS SF 2279-S*, a highly confidential source of San Francisco Office, furnishes information regarding letters emanating from Communist China and destined for individuals in U. S. Majority of such information is in Chinese language. San Francisco furnishes Photostats of these letters to Bureau where they are translated. Translations are then returned to San Francisco and San Francisco has responsibility of paraphrasing this information to protect source, and furnishing information to appropriate field offices for additional investigation. San Francisco letter 1-19-61 advised another highly confidential source had been developed which could furnish similar information re Chinese in Canada contacting Chinese in U. S. Majority of this information would also be in Chinese language and would require translation at Bureau. Bulet 2-3-61 instructed San Francisco to furnish Bureau more information re this new source (captioned subject) and specifically indicate value of such coverage. San Francisco letter 2-13-61 advised that the presence of pro-Chinese Communist individuals in Canada indicated need for such coverage. San Francisco pointed out Chinese Communists could conceivably contact individuals in the U. S. via Canada for espionage purposes. Also pointed out several specific cases regarding individuals in Canada whose activities are of interest to the Bureau and these cases could receive additional coverage through captioned source. San Francisco being instructed Bureau does not desire this source be activated in same manner as CS SF 2279-S*. The volume of material which would require translation would necessitate at least one more Chinese-language translator in the Translation Section. 83 sample items available from captioned source were reviewed and it was determined after translating these items that the information contained therein was of no value to Bureau. It should be noted that there is no indication at this time that Chinese Communists are sending espionage communications into U. S. by way of Canada. San Francisco being instructed to use this coverage only for specific cases and for submitting those items which it is believed will be of interest in this matter to Bureau.

Declassified by 1167 10/21/90

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 1/19/61

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (134-1987)

SUBJECT: CS SF 2471-S*

San Francisco is now being furnished by an anonymous source with information of value in the Chinese communist intelligence field relative to Canadian and U.S. contacts. San Francisco believes that this contact at this time with this anonymous source will be on a continual basis.

Photostats of this material, which is in Chinese characters, will be forwarded to the Bureau and it is requested the translations be handled in the same manner as that of CHIPROP (Bufile 100-394984).

Interested offices will be advised in the same manner as is now done with CS SF 2279-S*.

San Francisco will forward photostats to the Bureau via the attached form, upon the Bureau's approval of this form. It is suggested that the code name of CHICAN (Chinese Communist Propaganda entering San Francisco from Canada) be used for the attachment.

For administrative purposes, a new source file has been opened and the source has been given symbol number CS SF 2471-S*.

2 - Bureau (Encl. 1) (REG.)
1 - SF
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(3)

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2ALW/ldj

MCT - 25

REC- 33

Classified by 6283
Exempt from GDS, Category 25-4
Date of Declassification Indefinite

JAN 23 1961

EX-113

Declassified by INT. SEC.
1167 10/8/70

1 - Mr. J. D. Donahue ✓
- Mr. S. B. Donahoe
- Mr. Ruehl

SAC, San Francisco (134-1987)

2/3/61

Director, FBI (134-9844) - 1

PERSONAL ATTENTION

REC-31

CS SF 2471-S*
IS - CH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2AM/uj

Reurlet 1/19/61.

Immediately advise Bureau nature of information available from captioned source.

Relet implies information will be similar to that now being furnished by CS SF 2279-S*. If this is true, Bureau cannot see value of covering contacts between Chinese in Canada and Chinese in United States unless a strong presumption exists that the individuals in Canada are Chinese Communists.

VER:msb

(6)

NOTE: CS SF 2279-S* a highly confidential source of San Francisco Office, furnishes information regarding letters emanating from Communist China and destined for individuals in U. S. Majority of such information is in Chinese language. San Francisco furnishes Photostats of these letters to Bureau where they are translated. Translations are then returned to San Francisco, and San Francisco has responsibility of paraphrasing this information to protect CS SF 2279-S* and furnishing information to appropriate field offices for additional investigation. Relet advised San Francisco has developed an anonymous source which can furnish information of value re Chinese Communist intelligence activities regarding Canadian and U. S. contacts. This information will be in Chinese language and San Francisco intends to handle this information in the same fashion as information received from CS SF 2279-S* described above. San Francisco has proposed code name CHICAN (Chinese Communist Propaganda entering San Francisco from Canada) be used for this coverage. Apparently, proposed coverage concerns contacts between Chinese in Canada and Chinese in U. S. There is no indication that such coverage will be productive. San Francisco being instructed to furnish nature of information available from captioned source and indicate why such coverage will prove of value.

Classified by 6283
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

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Ingram _____
Gandy _____

51 FEB

9 1961

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (134-9844)

DATE: 11/27/61

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (134-1987)

SUBJECT: CSSF 2471-S*
IS - CH

On 11/20/61, the anonymous source which previously furnished information of value in the Chinese communist intelligence field relative to Canadian and U. S. contacts was discontinued, and as a consequence, this case is being closed in the San Francisco Division.

② - Bureau (Reg.)
2 - San Francisco (1 - 134-9844)
(1 - 105-10327)
PJH/jr (#11)
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2AM/dj

REC-127

EX-106

17 NOV 29 1961

185

~~SECRET~~

Classified by 6283
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

CHIPROP

HOLD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2ALM/clj

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 9/25/62

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: CHIPROP
CONF. INFO CSSF 2279-S*

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan
1 - Wannall
1 - DFXCallahan
1 - Jaquiss
1 - Ruehl

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2AMK/BJ

This is annual evaluation of captioned program.

ORIGIN: San Francisco developed (CSSF 2279-S*) on 8/1/56. This is a highly confidential source which has furnished valuable information regarding (Chinese) security matters. Source has access to data regarding contacts between persons in (Communist China) and (Hong Kong) with persons in the United States. Most of this information is in (Chinese) and translations are handled by FBI Laboratory. Translations are furnished San Francisco which in turn paraphrases the information and sends it to interested field offices. PURPOSE: This operation is designed to identify individuals in U.S. who, because of their contacts with individuals in (Communist China) constitute a possible threat to internal security of U.S. SCOPE: Program is field wide; however, most investigations are conducted by offices covering (large Chinese) populations and these offices have (Chinese) speaking personnel assigned. TIE IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS: Information emanating from this source reaches all areas of (Chinese) investigation.

CASE LOAD: Twenty-two cases are presently in pending status. One hundred twenty-one cases have been closed in past twelve months. COST: Source is not paid and investigations resulting from this program are absorbed by Agents currently handling security cases. PAST OR PRESENT REACTIONS: Source operates on a secure basis. San Francisco is aware that if security becomes an issue Bureau is to be advised immediately and operation discontinued until security can then again be guaranteed. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL: San Francisco furnishes other divisions with information obtained from this operation and also furnishes Bureau-approved instructions for handling and investigation. San Francisco has responsibility for determining security classification to be placed on information to be furnished by source. Bureau is advised of results of all investigation results from this operation. Program is examined annually at SOG to determine if changes are necessary. ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTIONS: Bureau instructions regarding handling material furnished by source are current and adequate.

VER: VMS
(8)

REG-26

1 - 100-394924 (GRABER) BY 6283
134-5103

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan
RE: CHIPROP
CSSF 2279-S*
134-5108

~~SECRET~~

OVER-ALL VALUE: Source makes available a great amount of information regarding conditions within Communist China. It provides a picture of economic and social conditions not otherwise available. From this source we are in a position to establish the reaction of the Chinese Communist people to the various policies and programs formulated by the Chinese Communist Government. Source has identified Chinese who have been educated in the United States and subsequently returned to Communist China and we have also been able to establish the type of work in which these individuals are engaged. This operation has also provided us with the names of individuals other than Chinese traveling in Communist China. This information is of particular interest to the Bureau when it involves citizens or permanent resident aliens from the United States. We have also identified scientists in the United States who maintain contact with scientists in Communist China. This information has disclosed particular areas of scientific research concerning which the Chinese Communists are endeavoring to obtain data. As a result of investigation based on information from this source we have developed individuals with excellent potential as double agents. OPERATION OF SOURCES: Agents handling this operation on a daily basis process approximately 13,500 items and this is done within two two-hour periods. For security reasons number of personnel engaged in this operation is held to a minimum. Agents extract approximately 100 items a day for consideration and possible additional action. Translations of Chinese language material furnished by source are reviewed at Bureau and names are searched for main files, or espionage references. Because of lack of identifying data no other references are reviewed as further investigation, if such is required, will disclose background data which will facilitate a more thorough search of Bureau records. Espionage references are reviewed even though it may not be possible to affect an immediate identification in order that such data may be furnished field for information.

CONTEMPLATED ACTION: At the present time (CSSF 2279-S*) is inoperative. By airtel 4/23/62 San Francisco advised Restricted Merchandise Unit, U.S. Customs, San Francisco, had been removed from the Old Custom House and placed in another locality. The operation of this source depends upon the Restricted Merchandise Unit being located in the Old Custom House. By letter dated 5/23/62 in response to an inquiry from the Bureau, San Francisco

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Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan

Re: CHIPROP
CSSF 2279-S*
134-5108

advised efforts were being made to restore the Restricted Merchandise Unit to a location where captioned source could again function. By airtel 6/12/62 San Francisco noted operation was still inactive because of the location of the Restricted Merchandise Unit. By airtel dated 7/27/62 San Francisco advised information had been received that there was a strong possibility that Restricted Merchandise Unit would be restored to the Old Custom House sometime during September, 1962. Bureau is carefully following with San Francisco.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

W.E.

W.E.
W.E.
W.E.

W.E.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

i - Ruehl

SAC, San Francisco (134-1132)

9/14/62

Director, FBI (134-5108)

(CSSE 2279-S*)
CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE (CH)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/24/00 BY SP2AM/ely

Reurairtel 7/27/62.

Promptly advise status of captioned source. Bureau wishes to know what the possibilities are for again placing captioned source in operation.

Your attention is directed to Bulet 2/23/60 regarding captioned source. Promptly submit analysis of results of information received from captioned source per instructions set forth in Bulet 2/23/60.

VER: gci
(4)

NOTE: (CSSE 2279-S*) is a highly confidential source developed by San Francisco Office 8/1/56. Source furnishes data regarding communications from individuals in Communist China and Hong Kong with individuals in U. S. This source has furnished vast amount of information which has been of assistance in all areas of (Chinese) investigations. Most of the information furnished by this source has not been available from any other source.

Operation of this source was made possible through cooperation of Customs employees in the restricted Merchandise Unit, San Francisco. On 4/23/62 the restricted Merchandise Unit was physically removed to another location where captioned source could not operate. By airtel dated 7/27/62 San Francisco advised there was a strong indication that the restricted Merchandise Unit would be returned to its original location sometime during September, 1962, and if this takes place our source can be reactivated.

MAILED 25

SEP 13 1962

COMM-FBI

REC-45

SEP 18 1962

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
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Tele. Room _____
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SEP 18 1962

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/16/60 BY SP1/ML/ly

DATE: 9-15-61

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO : W. C. Sullivan

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

SUBJECT:

(CHIPROP
 CS SF 2279-S*)

1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. Sullivan
 1 - Mr. Donahoe
 1 - Mr. Callahan
 1 - Mr. Huelkamp
 1 - Mr. Ruehl

This is semiannual evaluation of captioned program.

ORIGIN:

San Francisco 8-1-56 developed (CS SF 2279-S*), a highly confidential source, which since its inception has furnished valuable information regarding (Chinese) security matters. Source supplies data regarding contacts between persons in (Communist China) and (Hong Kong) with persons in the United States. Most of this information is in the (Chinese) language. San Francisco furnishes photostats of (Chinese) language material to Bureau for transliteration only. Transliterations are returned to San Francisco where pertinent information is paraphrased and sent to interested field offices.

PURPOSE:

Program is designed to identify individuals, particularly in the United States, who because of their contacts with individuals in (Communist China) may constitute a threat to the internal security of the United States.

SCOPE:

Program is field wide. Majority of investigation, however, is conducted by offices wherein (Chinese) speaking personnel are assigned as they are located in areas having large Chinese population.

TIE IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS:

This program furnishes such a vast amount of information that it touches all areas of (Chinese) investigation. It has been particularly helpful in identifying (Chinese) scientists in the United States who plan to depart for (Communist China). Bureau has program whereby particular coverage is given to such individuals in order to prevent removal of information or material vital to national defense.

Declassified by 1167 10/9/75

(134-5103)

EX-112

REC-95

CLASSIFIED BY

6283

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER-11632

EXEMPTION CATEGORY

2 + 3

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~~SECRET~~

Memorandum Donahoe to Sullivan

Re: CHIFROP

CS SF 2279-S*

134-5108

CASE LOAD:

Forty-six cases are presently in pending status. In past twelve months, 169 cases have been closed.

COST:

Source is not paid. Cases resulting from this program are absorbed by Agents currently investigating security cases.

PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESSES:

Source operates on a secure basis, and San Francisco is aware if security of this operation becomes an issue Bureau is to be advised immediately and operation discontinued until such time as security can again be guaranteed.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS:

San Francisco furnishes other divisions with paraphrased information obtained from this operation and also furnishes instructions to search field office indices and if necessary continue investigation to resolve whether individuals are security problems. San Francisco has responsibility to determine security classification to be placed on information furnished by source. Results of investigations are furnished Bureau thus keeping Bureau informed as to current status of all investigations resulting from this program. Program is examined semiannually at Seat of Government to determine if changes are necessary. San Francisco at six-month intervals furnishes information regarding security of source and summary of significant accomplishments for prior six-month period.

ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTIONS:

Bureau's instructions regarding handling material furnished by source are current and adequate. San Francisco's instructions to field are also current and adequate.

OVER-ALL VALUE:

Program furnishes a great amount of pertinent information regarding activities within (Communist China.) It provides an

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Memorandum Donahoe to Sullivan

Re: CHIPROP

CS SF 2279-S*

134-5108

accurate picture of scientific and economic conditions and has disclosed the reaction of the population to the efforts of (Communist China) to achieve certain scientific and economic goals. We have received information concerning (Chinese) educated in the United States who have returned to (Communist China) and in these cases, we have been able to identify the type of scientific work in which these individuals are engaged. During past six months, source has noted a considerable increase in complaints emanating from (Chinese) in vastly separated areas regarding deplorable economic conditions. Most prevalent complaint is that food is extremely difficult to obtain, and as a result, many (Chinese) are suffering from malnutrition and other maladies resulting from lack of nutritious foods. As a result of food shortage, numerous (Hong Kong) firms have been established to forward food packages to individuals in (Communist China) from overseas (Chinese). Food is in such short supply in (China) that even if an individual has money, he is unable to find food to purchase. This deplorable state has been verified in communications written by diplomatic personnel who are assigned to (Communist China). These individuals uniformly detest their assignment and eagerly await reassignment. Source furnishes lists of subscribers in United States to (Chinese Communist) magazines published in (China). We also receive current information regarding identities, locations, and political beliefs of former (Korean prisoners of war who decided to remain in China).

Source has identified numerous (Caucasians) traveling in (Communist China) and such information in the case of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens in United States has been made available to State Department. Bureau has been able to identify scientists in the United States who maintain contact with United States educated (Chinese) scientists who have returned to (China). From these contacts, we have been able to establish the particular types of scientific information (Chinese Communists) are endeavoring to obtain. Information from this source has made it clear (Chinese Communists) are maintaining a continuing pressure on (Chinese) scientists in the United States to return to (Communist China). Source recently furnished names and addresses of individuals in the United States receiving pornographic material from (Communist China) and appropriate field offices have been notified. Source identified a United States citizen, (a Cuban) who formerly resided in New York City and who is

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Memorandum Donahoe to Sullivan

Re: CHIPROP

CS SF 2279-S*

134-5108

now studying in (Communist China) as a narcotics addict in contact with addicts residing in New York City. The individual in (China) hopes to obtain names and addresses of individuals in Europe from whom narcotics may be purchased. San Francisco at frequent intervals reviews information furnished by source and reduces pertinent items of interest to other Government agencies to letterhead memoranda which are furnished Bureau and subsequently disseminated.

CONTEMPLATED ACTION:

This program will be continued without change.

OPERATION OF SOURCE:

Agents handling this operation daily process approximately 13,500 first-class items, and this is done within two two-hour periods. Because of security consideration involved, number of personnel engaged in this operation is held to absolute minimum. Agents extract approximately one hundred items a day for consideration and possible further action. San Francisco furnishes field divisions only material which can be considered as having potential intelligence value.

Transliterations of (Chinese) language material emanating from source are reviewed at Bureau, and names are searched for main file or espionage references. In view of characteristic lack of identifying data, no other references are reviewed as, if information requires further investigation, such inquiry will disclose background data which will enable us to determine whether Bureau records contain information identifiable with individual concerning whom source has furnished data. Main files are searched in order that copies of transliterations may be placed in such files. Espionage references are reviewed, even though it may not be possible to effect an immediate identification, in order that field will be provided such data which may or may not be identical with individuals concerning whom source has furnished information.

RECOMMENDATION:

Procedures for handling this program be reviewed in six months to determine if any changes are necessary.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (134-5108)

DATE: 3/11/60

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (134-1132)

SUBJECT: CS SF 2279-S*
CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE (CHINESE)ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2AUM/clj

ReBulet 2/23/60.

The following data is being furnished to the Bureau concerning the operation of this source:

The operation of this source is secure from all standpoints at this time. If this security becomes an issue at any time in the future, the Bureau will be immediately notified and the source will be discontinued until such time as its security can be guaranteed.

As the Bureau is well aware, this source furnishes a magnitude of vital information pertaining to activities within (Red China) including its economical and industrial achievements. For instance, during the past six months, this source continued to furnish information relating to U.S. educated (Chinese) who have since returned to (Red China) and identified their current positions in their respective fields of science. This source also reveals the intimate feelings which these (Chinese) scientists have concerning life in (China) as well as their pros and cons concerning life and science in general, while studying and residing in the U.S. A true picture of life in (China) today is also related by the information which this source furnishes reflecting life in general to be horrible due to the lack of proper food, housing, clothes, equipment, and the complete disregard of a human person's individual rights.

Source still continues to furnish up-to-date news on (the former Korean prisoners of war (turncoats) and their true feelings, both pro-Chinese communist and anti-US, as well as their future plans. Source reveals the identity of their friends in the U.S., as well as the current activities and residences of these (turncoats) who have since returned from (China) to the U.S.

2 - Bureau (AM REG.)
1 - SF
PJH/lis
(3)

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Source has furnished complete subscription lists of various (Chinese) communist publications, including "China Reconstructs," "Peking Review," "China Literature" and other leading pro-Chinese communist publications which are published in (Hong Kong, B.C.C.) In this regard, source furnishes identities of those individuals residing in the U.S. who act as agents for these (Chinese) communist publications.

Source still continues to furnish up-to-date news concerning American citizens who have pro-Chinese communist sympathies residing (on the Mainland of China.) These Americans in some way are employed by the (Chinese Communist) Government and in particular, the source was able to locate the current whereabouts of one (VIRGINIUS FRANK COE, New York) espionage subject, who has been missing (since about (1956)) This source continues to furnish pertinent information also relative to the activities and writings of (ANNA LOUISE STRONG) and her fight to have the U.S. recognize Red China.)

This source continually furnishes the identities of many U.S. citizens who have violated the U.S. passport laws by having actually traveled to and throughout (Red China.)

Source continually identifies certain U.S. scientists who are on friendly terms with U.S. educated (Chinese) scientists who have since returned to (China) and at the same time, makes available certain requests which these (Chinese) scientists make of their scientific friends in the U.S. In certain instances, the Bureau has been able to develop potential double agents in the (Chinese) security field, because of these requests made by these (Chinese) scientists and in particular, San Francisco makes reference to the case of (DR. Y.P. SUN) a research chemist for (Shell Development Corporation, Modesto, California) It also assists in evaluating the reliability of double agents as in the case of (RAYMOND TOM) (who has been approached by representatives of the New China News Agency) In (TOM's) case, this source has been able to corroborate information which (TOM) has furnished the Bureau.

In the counterintelligence field, this source continues to monitor correspondence to one (JAMES CHAO) who resides in (Ann Arbor, Michigan) it being pointed out that (CHAO) was alleged to be an actual agent for the (Bank of China) which is a (Chinese) communist front.

Considerable data has been uncovered concerning pro-(Chinese) communist sympathies on the part of U.S. Government employees, thus causing the field and the Bureau to initiate 140 SGE cases.

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This source enables San Francisco to keep up with the current residences and employments of various San Francisco security and SI subjects and at the same time, source furnishes the viewpoints which these Subjects have concerning (Red China) as well as their anti-US statements which they have made.

Source has uncovered the whereabouts of a Selective Service subject of the San Francisco Division, namely (T'ONG King-yip) who recently graduated from the University of (Peking) after being missing from the San Francisco area for several years.

In other instances, this source has revealed several (Chinese) security subjects to be now residing on the Mainland of (China) and attending institutions of higher learning even though US passports for these individuals have not been issued.

Source has identified certain U.S. scientists who have traveled to (Moscow) as well as European countries to attend various scientific conferences there. During these conferences, some of these U.S. scientists have become quite friendly with (Chinese) scientists and have initiated correspondence. Although some of these U.S. scientists have been contacted by the field relative to their willingness to cooperate in the double-agent field, San Francisco has no knowledge concerning the outcome.

Source still continues to furnish pertinent information relating to various (CIA) subjects which information has been disseminated. Many of the U.S. educated (Chinese) scientists have been approached by (CIA's covert operation in San Francisco) to act as double agents (by that agency.)

Source continually shows the techniques and pressure put on (Chinese) scientists remaining in the U.S. in order to force them to return to (China) and work for the motherland. In this regard, source has given the U.S. valuable information concerning the advancement which the (Chinese) communists have made in certain scientific fields.

Source still continues to identify numerous U.S. citizens who are in contact with various (Hong Kong pro-Chinese) communist publishing firms.

It has also furnished correct Chinese family names, which reflect that (Chinese) individuals are residing in the U.S. fraudulently and has also furnished "coaching papers" for individuals to use. It has also furnished data as to how finances may be sent to (Communist China) through drops in (Hong Kong) and has also furnished information relative to the manner in which individuals are able to leave (Communist China) which has been of assistance in evaluating the stories which recent immigrants furnish during the course of interviews by Bureau agents.

~~SECRET~~

(SF 134-1132)
PJH/lis

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Numerous potential security informants have been developed due to the type of information which this source has furnished in San Francisco.

Upon receipt of the translations of the (Chinese) material which is forwarded to the Bureau, as well as an evaluation made of the English language material, which is photostated, San Francisco furnishes to the other field divisions only that material which can be construed as having intelligence value. In many instances, San Francisco has knowledge concerning the identities of security subjects residing within other field divisions and furnishes pertinent data concerning these individuals. Numerous requests are made by certain (Chinese) scientists to forward to them certain technical books and publications in the scientific field which information is also furnished to other field divisions.

In the case of (Caucasians) traveling throughout (Red China) who may possibly be U.S. citizens, this data is also furnished to other offices.

At this time, this source as a general rule has access to all mail emanating from (Hong Kong, B.C.C. and Communist China) destined for the U.S; however, on certain occasions, this source, due to the routing of mail by the Post Office from the Airport, sometimes misses certain mail bags.

For the Bureau's information, San Francisco processes approximately 13,500 first class letters a day not including third class publications. In this connection; however, it is noted that the processing must be done in a very limited time, two hours maximum. Furthermore, in view of the existing limitations, the quantity of material chosen for complete translation is necessarily limited to no more than 50 per day, some of which as further time permits for a closer scrutiny, is later disregarded and no further action taken, other than returning the material to the source.

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-394984)

DATE: 9/4/56

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (105-2563)

SUBJECT: CHINESE COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
ENTERING THE UNITED STATES AT
SAN FRANCISCO
IS - (CH)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/26/50 BY SP2AM/ldj

THIS COMMUNICATION CONTAINS INFORMATION
RECEIVED FROM A HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE.
IF ANY OF THIS INFORMATION IS TO BE UTILIZED
IN A REPORT OR OTHER DOCUMENT, IT
SHOULD BE CAREFULLY PARAPHRASED SO AS TO
AFFORD FULL PROTECTION TO THE SOURCE INVOLVED.

On 8/16/56, (CS SF 2279-S*) made available correspondence
from which the enclosed photostats for the Bureau and New York
were made, which correspondence was addressed to the Editorial
board of "Political Affairs," New Century Publishers, Inc., 332
Broadway, New York 3, New York, and was from a (WANG TZE-KUO,
Peking, China.)

Correspondence is self-explanatory and is enclosed for
the information of the Bureau and New York.

- 2 - Bureau (100-394984) (Enc. 1) (RM)
- 1 - New York (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
- 2 - San Francisco (105-2563)
(1 - 134-11324)

TJP:il
(5)

RECORDED - 59

INDEXED - 59

SEP 10 1956

Declassified by 1167 10/9/75

6-253
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Exempt from GDS, Category 1
Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

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Office Memorandum

GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. BOARDMAN

UNCLASSIFIED
SIDE FOR
CLASSIFICATION
ACTION

DATE: January 22, 1958

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE (U.S.S.R.)

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

On January 10, 1958, [Harry Stone] of MI-5, Liaison Representative with the Bureau, confidentially advised that his service had determined that [Soviet] illegal agents all over the world, when they want a meet with their principal, are under instructions to send a proper communication to "K. S. Smirnov, Central Post Office, Vladimir, U.S.S.R." Mr. Stone stated (S) that the aforementioned information was being made available to the Bureau and the (RCMP) only.

On the basis of this information, we immediately instructed the Washington Field and New York Offices to institute confidential inquiries with appropriate Post Office officials to determine the feasibility of covering outgoing correspondence from the U.S. to the (U.S.S.R.), looking toward picking up a communication dispatched to the aforementioned address.

On January 21, 1958, SAC (Powers) of the New York Office called advising that his preliminary inquiries at first disclosed that such coverage could possibly be effected at LaGuardia Airfield. Powers stated that he subsequently received a call from the Chief Post Office Inspector who told him that he would not be able to make such arrangements and explained that something had happened in Washington on a similar matter and that Bureau Headquarters should take up the matter with Post Office Headquarters here in Washington. The Post Office Inspector said that it did not involve our agency and because of what was going on in Washington at the present time, he just couldn't do it on his own.

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

(5)

cc: 1 - Boardman
1 - Belmont**SECRET**

FEB 20 1958

REC-94

273-10070

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

10/26/00
CLASSIFIED BY SP2 RLM/eli
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6
MDR-16

SECRET

MEMO TO: MR. BOARDMAN
RE: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE (U.S.S.R.)

and in view of the volume of material being sent from the U.S., their coverage is an extensive and expensive operation. He indicated that they had to set up an elaborate array of IBM machines to tally and tabulate the results. In addition a complicated indexing procedure was involved, as well as complex scientific

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

It would appear that our inquiries of the Post Office officials in New York have flushed out a most secret operation of [redacted]. The question immediately arises as to whether [redacted] in effecting this coverage in New York has invaded our jurisdiction. In this regard, it is believed that they have a

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

same time, there is an internal security objective here in which, because of our responsibilities, we have a definite interest, namely, the identification of illegal espionage agents who may be in the United States. While recognizing this interest, it is not believed that the Bureau should assume this coverage because of the inherent dangers in the sensitive nature of it, its complexity, size and expense. It is believed that we can capitalize on this coverage by pointing out to CIA our internal security objectives and holding them responsible to share their coverage with us. Of course, we are not interested in the identities of the numerous persons in this country legitimately corresponding abroad. The Post Office has indicated there are approximately four thousand items of correspondence to the (U.S.S.R.) each day. [redacted]

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

ACTION:

SECRET

1. On the basis of our inquiries conducted in New York, we are in a position and should, through Liaison, approach [redacted]

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

We should get from them the details of their coverage and explain our interest in being furnished with the results of the coverage as it might effect internal security matters.

SECRET

MEMO TO: MR. BOARDMAN
RE: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE (U.S.S.R.)

2. It is believed that we can and should furnish CIA with the name and (Moscow) address furnished us by the [British], telling CIA that we want to (S) be advised of any communications going to that address. We will not explain to them our interest in the particular address and, therefore, we will not be violating the confidence of the [British.] (S)

3. In view of the highly sensitive nature of this coverage, we will have to work out arrangements so that knowledge of it is strictly confined within the Bureau. We will handle this the same as handle communications intelligence data.

(war AB 10/2/50)
PB
SAB
OK
V. 7-10-50

SECRET

SECRET

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPTWHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
DATE February 6, 1958

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

JUNE

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE (U.S.S.R.)

CLASSIFIED BY SP2A/mj/eh
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
Nease	_____

Reference my memo of 1-27-58 advising of the briefing given our

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

secret writing has been made to a limited extent because the volume of mail has been too numerous for the establishment of a practical system without delaying movement of the mail. CIA has advised that to date it has not discovered any microdots or secret writing or information revealing evidence of Soviet intelligence operations in the United States.

but that its system of opening mail is rapidly increasing. [] has expressed a willingness to furnish us any information obtained from this coverage which we feel would be of interest to us.

An analysis has been made of CIA capabilities as revealed to the Liaison Agent and it is believed we should request that CIA furnish us information of the following types, both that which has been received in the past and that which they will obtain in the future:

- 1) All correspondence of a suspicious nature, such as that containing double talk, et cetera.
- 2) All correspondence indicating that the (Soviets) may be utilizing a hostage situation, i.e., correspondence indicating pressure being exerted on (Soviet) citizens who have close relatives in the U.S. or pressure being exerted on individuals in U.S.
- 3) Any information appearing in correspondence indicating weaknesses or dissatisfaction on the part of any Soviet presently in the United States so that the Bureau might give consideration to feasibility of approaching such individuals for defection or double agent purposes.
- 4) Any information appearing in correspondence indicating Soviet control or direction of the Cp, USA.

cc - Messrs. Boardman
Branigan
Baumgardner

Belmont
Litrento
JDDonohue
Turner

REC-94

EX-135

10 FEB 20 1958

SECRET

SECRET

Belmont to Boardman (2-6-58)
re: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE (U.S.S.R.)

With regard to the above coverage, it is believed desirable that Liaison make arrangements for us to review [redacted] JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

[redacted] JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

arrangement can be worked out with CIA in a proper fashion.

In addition to the above it is believed the following arrangements can be effected with CIA:

1) Place stops against names and addresses of individuals possibly presently engaged in (Soviet) espionage to determine if they are in correspondence with (U.S.S.R.) This would include a check of the back traffic on these individuals also. We would, of course, make these stops on a highly selective basis.

2) Request CIA to place stops against addresses in (Soviet Russia) believed by the Bureau to be mail drops or suspected mail drops. (It should be noted that we already have placed a stop with CIA against the name and address of [redacted] JFK Act 6 (1) (B) [redacted] which, according to information received from MI-5, is a drop utilized by (Soviet) illegal agents all over the world arranging emergency meetings. (S)

We will, of course, continue to analyze this coverage by CIA to see that we obtain maximum benefits.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) That information received from this source be hereinafter designated as (Bureau Informant 200). Records Section has advised that this informant symbol has not been previously used.

2) That this matter and any mail relating thereto be labeled "June" and then filed and maintained in the (Sovme) Unit, Room 1734 (the regular repository of "June" mail) to afford maximum security to this source.

3) That our Liaison Agent orally advise CIA of the type of data set forth above that would be of interest to us and make arrangements with CIA so that we can review this type of information in order to select that which we feel will warrant further investigation. Liaison should also perfect the arrangement with CIA so that on a continuing basis we can place appropriate stops with them.

SECRET

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

4) In view of the extreme sensitivity of this matter, a confirmatory memorandum

SECRET

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.**

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY 202 ALM/dj

6 February 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: (Mr. S. J. Papich)

SUBJECT: ~~X~~ HUNTER Report #1

1. The intercept project that has been explained orally to (Mr. Papich) will be referred to as [redacted] in correspondence between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Agency. EPK Act 6 (1)(B)

2. This explanatory memorandum constitutes HUNTER Report #1. Future disseminations will be numbered consecutively.

3. In submitting possible traces on individuals of interest to you, reports will be submitted in the following form:

a. If the individual named in the intercept appears to be identical with the individual of interest to you, you will be furnished a reproduction of the exterior, and of the contents if the item has been opened.

b. If the individual named in the intercept is only possibly identical with the individual of interest to you, only machine run listing of the items will be submitted. In such cases a reproduction of the exterior and of the contents, if the item has been opened, will be available upon request.

4. In order to facilitate your reading of machine run entries, there follows an explanation of the various types of replies which you will receive in connection with requests. A hypothetical request for any addressee in the U. S. of mail from (P. KROVAN) whose location is believed to be in (Moscow) might result in the following reply:

REC-94

EX-135

105-93089-3
10 FEB 20 1958

SECRET

SECRET

<u>Date</u>	<u>Name In</u>	<u>Ref</u>	<u>Loc</u>	<u>Name Out</u>	<u>Ref</u>	<u>Loc</u>	<u>Ban</u>	<u>Firms</u>
A 57CO5C3325	(KROVAN, Paraskoviya)	(*)	ABB	EVOSWA, Wasyl	()	KM		

This reply has the following meaning:

"A" has no present meaning. All numbers are now preceeded by "A" only to allow for future additional classifications. None are presently contemplated.

"57CO5" is the date of intercept, namely: "57" is the year. "C" indicates the month. The code key for months is set out as Enclosure 1. "05" is the day of the month. Thus, "57CO5" is 5 March 1957.

The group "C3325" is our own internal filing number.

The "Name In" entry identifies the correspondent inside the (USSR).

The asterisk in "Ref" column indicates that (KROVAN) sent the letter.

The entry in "Loc"(ation) column indicates the area or city inside the (Soviet Union) from which the letter was mailed. In this case it was mailed from the western section of (Ukrainian SSR). The code key used for this column is set out in Enclosure 2. This code key is to be used for all items prior to 1 January 1958, on which date a 4-place code was instituted in order to designate more precisely the localities within the (USSR). A copy of this new code is enclosed as Enclosure 3.

The "Name Out" entry identifies the correspondent outside the (USSR). In both the "Name In" and "Name Out" columns, the last or family name is listed first.

The absence of an asterisk in the "Ref" column after EVOSWA indicates that she is the recipient of the letter.

The entry in the second "Loc"(ation) column indicates the state of the U.S. (in this case, New Jersey) to which the letter was addressed. The code key used for this column is set out in Enclosure 4. You will note that some 3-digit entries indicate large cities within a state, thus KO indicates New York State and KOA indicates New York City. For your convenience an alphabetical list of the states with their code indicator is set out in Enclosure 5.

SECRET

The absence of an "X" in the "Ban" column means that the letter was not opened and that only the exterior is recorded in our files.

5. Since the hypothetical request was for mail from (P. KROVAN, who is believed to be located in (Moscow) only the listing as set out above would be furnished, since it would not appear that (Paraskoviya KROVAN, located in the western section of the (Ukrainian SSR) is identical. If in connection with future investigation or information otherwise available, you may believe that (KROVAN) may be identical with the individual of interest to you, you need reference only the HUNTER report number and request the exterior photographs of item No. A57C05C3325, which will be reproduced from the original film and made available to you.

6. If the hypothetical request is for any mail from the (Soviet Union to Rose ESTERSON, who resides in Chicago, the reply might be as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Name In</u>	<u>Ref</u>	<u>Loc</u>	<u>Name Out</u>	<u>Ref</u>	<u>Loc</u>	<u>Ban</u>	<u>Firms</u>
A57D23U 57D18	(AVRUNINA, Vera)	(*)	AAA	(ESTERSON, Rose)		KKB	X	

The difference in this listing from that previously illustrated is as follows:

"U" is our internal identifying designator. The first date is the date of the intercept. The second date is the date of the communication inside the letter. The "X" under the "Ban" column indicates the letter was opened. Again this indicator would indicate only a possible identification since KKB under "Loc" indicates California. In this instance upon request, identifying the HUNTER report number and referencing both A57D23U and 57D18 numbers, the outer envelopes and their contents will be reproduced and furnished to you.

7. Normal service of either of the above requests will be 24 hours. In an emergency we could service the request in a few minutes.

8. If your first request had been for (KROVAN, or P. KROVAN, or Paraskoviya KROVAN) located in the western section of the (Ukrainian SSR) you would have initially received the photograph of the envelope. Likewise, in the second instance, if your request had

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SECRET

been for (ESTERSON, or R. ESTERSON, or Rose ESTERSON) located in Chicago, or Illinois, you would initially have received photographed copies of the envelope and its contents.

9. In order to insure most efficient servicing of your request, it is suggested that you submit trace requests as follows: List the last name first with any known first and given names or initials, and address including state, city and street, if known. If an exact address is not known, a probable state or section will be helpful but is not required. The same would apply to the (USSR). The above should be listed on duplicate 3 x 5 cards. If only a phonetic name is known, various combinations of spellings would be appreciated, together with any other data such as probable address or area. Where an address is known and there are individuals, other than the subject, at this address to whom the questioned communication might be addressed, their names should also be given. For record purposes and in order to facilitate our answers to your request, would you in turn number each card as Request No. _____.

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

10. On each request will you also indicate whether the request is for a one-time check or whether the name should be put on the Watch List. If the latter, please indicate the duration of the Watch List, i.e. 30, 60, 90 days, or "until cancelled". If a Watch List is requested, you should also indicate the treatment desired when a possible hit is made, i.e. photograph outside only; photograph outside and contents; photograph outside, contents, and examine for S/W or microdots. Specifically indicate any Watch List item which should not be opened. In this connection you may also desire to give us a white list of correspondents of interest to you who are not Watch List subjects but whose mail should not be opened in the course of our normal openings for spot-checking for operational or intelligence information. In some instances you may desire to indicate that you are to be informed immediately when a hit is made and prior to the receipt of the letter by the addressee.

11. It is possible to make a special machine run of the names of all correspondents either addressor, addressee, or both, from any specific area in the (USSR) to the United States or to any specific state or city in the U.S., or vice versa. There are various other combinations that could be run, such as all letters mailed in Florida either on a specific date or for any given period. If the above-listed

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SECRET

or any other type of exploratory processing is desired, a presentation of the problem will enable us to tell you immediately what we can do, how long it will take, and the amount of work that is involved. While this type of service is possible, it does involve a great deal of work and should be requested in connection with very important cases only.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:



JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

Enclosures (5)

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

1 - Belmont
1 - Branigan
1 - Litrento
1 - Schweppe

DATE: 4-21-58

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: (BUREAU INFORMANT 200)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2ALM/ly

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

(Bureau Informant 200) is the symbol number designated for information furnished by CIA to the Bureau from its coverage of mail going to and from the (USSR). This designation was approved in your memorandum to Mr. Boardman dated 2-6-58. That memo pointed out the willingness of CIA to furnish us any information obtained from this coverage which we felt would be of interest to us. That memo recommended that Liaison effect arrangements with CIA so that we could review information obtained from that coverage.

CIA is furnishing us with certain of the results of the coverage of [REDACTED] Each report received is labeled with a report number, for example, Hunter Report # 19.

The reports received are reviewed in the (Soume) Unit. When the information fails to indicate which Section or Unit would have a logical interest in the report, the names involved will be searched for identifiable information. When we can locate no such information, a case will be opened if deemed warranted. The objectives of these investigations will be the identification of persons of pro-Soviet sympathies whose dealings with the (Russians) are of a security or intelligence interest, the identification of those individuals who might present logical "hostage" possibilities which could be exploited by the Soviets and the identification of any (Soviet) individual in the U.S. who has indicated weakness or dissatisfaction, a situation which the Bureau might exploit for defection or double agent purposes.

Investigations in the field would include a check of office indices and logical sources and informants in order to establish the subject's background, activities, sympathies and the strategic character of his employment. This could culminate in recommendations for interview to clarify certain points not established by investigation and to determine whether the present activities of the subject are inimical to the best interests of the U.S., provided available information does not dictate against such interview and provided the interview can be conducted without compromising (Bureau Informant 200).

Information from (Bureau Informant 200) would be forwarded to the field, personal attention SAC, utilizing the following or similar phraseology: "Information has been received from (Bureau Informant 200)

105-67845
MAY 8 1958
HWS:cvg

NW 55164 DocId: 32989612 Page 51

REC-11 (105-93089-9)

10 MAY 2 1958

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont

Re: BUREAU INFORMANT 200

105-67845

a most sensitive and reliable source, indicating that John Doe has been in direct contact with....." The contents of the [redacted] should then be summarized as necessary and paraphrased. Following the reporting of information found in Bufiles on the subject, and instructions regarding the investigation to be conducted a paragraph as follows should also be added: "You are being cautioned that information obtained from Bureau Informant 200 is not to be disseminated outside the Bureau and should not be set forth in any investigative reports. Information from this informant should be utilized for lead purposes only. You must avoid any statement concerning the scope of the coverage in effect in this instance and under no circumstances is the subject or any unauthorized person to become aware that we have knowledge of his contact with a person in Russia." (JFK Act 6 (1) (B))

In those instances where an opened or closed case file on a person mentioned in a [redacted] is located at the Bureau, the [redacted] will be forwarded to the appropriate Section Chief or Supervisor for his information and any action he deems necessary. Said Supervisor might desire to advise the field in the manner described above or place a brief, paraphrased version of the [redacted] into the subject's main file for information purposes. (JFK Act 6 (1) (B))

RECOMMENDATION:

In view of the extreme sensitivity of this source, the knowledge of the same is to be confined to a need-to-know basis. Therefore, within the Domestic Intelligence Division the Section Chiefs of the Nationalities and Intelligence Section, the Internal Security Section, and the Subversive Control Section will be advised of the above procedure for their personal information. All supervisors in the Espionage Section will also be informed of this procedure.

WMS
pbw
V.
SHH
JH
JH

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: March 10, 1961

FROM : MR. D. E. MOORE *oem*SUBJECT: HUNTER P.
ESPIONAGE - R

cc Mr. Parsons
 Mr. Conrad
 Mr. Belmont
 Mr. D. E. Moore
 Mr. Branigan
 Mr. W. D. Stewart

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 10/26/00 BY SP1AM/clj

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

On 3-9-61 during a conference on Soviet illegal es-
 pionage activities between Special Agents Parich, Litrento,
 Duckett and [redacted] and [redacted]
 were advised that [redacted]

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

He said the laboratory is fully equipped and they would be glad
 to make its facilities available to us if at any time we desire
 an examination of this nature to be made in NYC and time was of
 the essence and would not permit the material to be brought to
 our Laboratory in Washington, D.C. We expressed our appreciation
 for the offer and said that in the event we desired to utilize
 their laboratory, we would contact them.

ACTION: For information.

DEM:td. (7)

Another misread!

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

EX-114

REC- 22

7 MAR 23 1961

63 MAR 28 1961

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

March 10, 1972

BY CIA COURIER

JFK AC 6 (1) (B)

JFK Ad 6 (1)(B)

- ☐ 1. For your information, I am enclosing communications which may be of interest to you.
- ☐ 2. It will be appreciated if you will have the investigation conducted as requested in the enclosed memorandum and furnish the results.
- ☐ 3. No further investigation is contemplated with regard to this matter.
- ☐ 4. You will be advised of the pertinent developments in connection with this inquiry.
- ☐ 5. Please note change in caption of this case.
- ☐ 6. Status of case: ☐ Completed ☐ Incomplete
- REC-50 100-100000-100000
MAR 10 1972

Very truly yours,

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

John Edgar Hoover
Director

SECRET

ENC.

Reference is made to your special notation on [redacted] No. 27,226, Item 72A13AM. Attached is a list of types of traffic we would like to receive.

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

ENCLOSURE

97 MAR 1 1972

SECRET

1 - M. J. Triplett
1 - W. O. Cregar

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

March 10, 1972

RE: PROJECT HUNTER

We are in the process of reviewing the Watch List and will advise you of additions and deletions. The following types of traffic have been of assistance and continue to be of interest to us:

1. Current and former [Soviet] exchange students, visitors, researchers and scientists.
2. Current and former [Soviet] official visitors.
3. Current and former [Soviet] nonofficial visitors whose U.S. contacts are subversive, would be of interest to the [Soviets] because of their access to classified data or are in a position to be of assistance to the [Soviets].
4. U.S. exchange students, researchers and persons who have been in the [USSR] with American exhibitions and delegations.
5. Current and former U.S. students and researchers in the [USSR] who do not come under official East-West Exchange Program. This does not include the short-term student tours but does include individuals who are in the [USSR] for some time. We would, of course, like to receive any traffic on individuals who are there for a short time if they have been sponsored by subversive organizations and subversive individuals or have received special invitations or special treatment from the [Soviets].
6. We have no interest in the hundreds of legitimate travelers who visit the [USSR] on regular tours or go to see relatives. We do have an interest in travel and contacts involving persons on the Watch List; known communists, New Left activists, extremists and other subversives; suspected and known espionage agents; individuals known to be of interest to the [Soviets] because of their specialized knowledge or work on classified matters; individuals who appear to have been compromised; and persons who meet with [Soviets] connected with organizations known to specialize in propaganda or in obtaining information regarding the U.S.
7. Communist Party and front organizations (such as [American Russian] Institute, National Council of [American-Soviet Friendship] and [Ukrainian News]), extremist and New Left organizations.

105-93089

M.E. Triplett [Met] (4)

(105-93089-96)

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

8. Protest and peace organizations, such as People's Coalition for Peace and Justice, National Peace Action Committee and Women's Strike for Peace.

9. Communists, Trotskyites and members of other Marxist-Leninist, subversive and extremist groups, such as the Black Panthers, White Panthers, Black Nationalist and Liberation groups, Venceremos Brigade, Venceremos Organization, Weathermen, Progressive-Labor Party, Worker's Student Alliance, Students for a Democratic Society, Resist, Revolutionary Union and other New Left groups. This would include persons sympathetic to the (Soviet Union, North Korea, North Vietnam and Red China.) Far East

10. (Cubans and pro-Castro) individuals in the U.S.

11. Traffic to and from (Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands) showing anti-U.S. or subversive sympathies.

12. Contacts with the (Soviet Red Cross), particularly those made or received by individuals.

13. (Soviet Committee for Cultural Relations with Compatriots Abroad) (contacts with emigres and emigre organizations in U.S.).

14. Traffic between U.S. nationals and aliens in the U.S. with individuals attending such institutions as the (Central Komsomol School and Friendship) University. This would include any aliens in the U.S. who have previously been in the (USSR) as students.

NOTE: Above sent in answer to special notation on Hunter Report 27,226, Item 72A13AM ((105-67845-38542)) reading as follows: "Your 30 October 1962 statement of [redacted] requirements does not cover contacts such as the one reflected in attached item. Please advise whether you wish to see traffic from U.S. nationals or aliens temporarily residing in the U.S. (e.g., foreign students) to relatives or friends studying at (Friendship) University or similar institutions. You may wish to take this opportunity to review, and possibly revise, your above-cited requirements statement." Subsequent to 10-30-62 memo, there have been several oral requests for other types (Items 1,2,3,12 and 14) and [redacted] asked us if we desired information on New Left and Black Nationalist fields on 1-15-69 and we advised them that we did. They had made a similar inquiry regarding P.O. Boxes utilized by the (Soviets by Soviet Committee for Cultural Relations with Compatriots Abroad) [redacted] Report 27,226 was dated January 25, 1972, and transmittal letter was signed by [redacted]

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)
JFK Act 6 (1) (B)
JFK Act 6 (1) (B)
JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

- 2 -

SECRET

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: [BUREAU INFORMANT 200] - Policy

1-Mr. E. S. Miller
1-Mr. J. P. Lee
1-Miss M. E. Triplett

DATE: February 15, 1973

1-Mr. Branigan

Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Baker _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Gebhardt _____
Mr. Jenkins _____
Mr. Marshall _____
Mr. Miller, E.S. ☒
Mr. Purvis _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Mr. Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Mr. Bowers _____
Mr. Herington _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mr. Mintz _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

10/26/00
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/clj
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1,6

[Bureau Informant 200] is the symbol number
designated for information furnished on a highly confi-

UFG Act 6 (1)(B)

1:00 PM
-20-73
7

File in [05-93089]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SECRET

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

5. 80a R

SECRET

Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to Mr. E. S. Miller
RE: [BUREAU INFORMANT 200]

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

The Bureau has always handled [] material on a strict need-to-know basis. The material received is handled on one desk in the Domestic Intelligence Division where it is screened for items of possible investigative use and retention. Material of no interest is destroyed. [] material can be only transmitted to our field divisions in paraphrased form and can only be used for investigative purposes. The material can never be incorporated in any communication which is intended for dissemination outside of the Bureau. [] material that is retained is kept in a Special File Room in the Records Branch at the Identification Division Building. Periodically CIA has been furnished with general guidelines as to the material which would be of special interest to our needs. [For example, we are currently interested in material concerning current and former [Soviet] exchange students, visitors, researchers, and scientists.] (S) We are likewise interested in Americans who are in the [USSR] for an appreciable period of time. We are interested in American communists and other extremists who may be corresponding with persons in the [USSR].

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

We have always considered the product from [] as valuable to our investigative interests. [In this connection, it has provided us with the identities of Americans in contact with [Soviet] exchange students in the United States who offer some potential as informants regarding the [Soviet] students' activities. We know from highly confidential sources that a proportion of these students have already been recruited by one or the other of the major [Soviet] Intelligence Services. We know also that many of the exchange students will subsequently be posted to the United States in some official capacity.] (S)

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

[] has identified numerous individuals from the United States and from other areas of the world in attendance at the [Central Komsomol School and Friendship] University. (S)

CIA has permitted us to furnish them the names of specific individuals in whom we have an investigative interest, and this has been valuable in covering their activities. [The product from [] has also been valuable in identifying [Soviets] who plan to and later visit the United States.] (S)

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

- 2 -

SECRET

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET

Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to Mr. E. S. Miller
RE: [BUREAU INFORMANT 200]

The [Soviet Union] is currently building up the number of trade representatives who will be assigned in various areas of the United States where we normally would not have coverage. We anticipate that [] would be valuable in providing leads for any necessary coverage of these people. (S) JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

With the relaxation of tensions between the U. S. and the [USSR] the volume of correspondence has obviously increased. We do not currently know what that volume is. To the best of []

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

ACTION:

The above is submitted for possible use by the Acting Director for the visit of []

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

EM

7
JUL 11-16
9:10 P

[DDK/DMA3]

CONFIRMED WITH GEN.

[] FOR 2:00 P.M.

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

TUESDAY, 2-20-73

7

- 3 -

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: January 16, 1969

FROM : S. J. Papich

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP7AM/clj

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - Policy
UTILIZATION OF SOURCE IN THE
NEW LEFT AND BLACK NATIONALIST FIELDS

On January 15, 1969, [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), suggested to the Liaison Agent that the Bureau should not overlook the utilization of the Agency's [redacted] for the development of leads in the New Left and Black Nationalist fields. [redacted] admitted the traffic involving individuals in these areas might be light but that the Bureau might wish to give consideration to placing stops on certain key personalities.

The [redacted] for which we have given the designation of (Bureau Informant 200) essentially consists of [redacted]

If we have some reason to believe that one of our subject's is communicating with anybody in the (Soviet Union), it might be worthwhile to place a stop.

We should bear in mind that this coverage is extremely sensitive and the handling of any matters involving (Bureau Informant 200) should conform with the ground rules which have been established. (See (Mary Triplett, extension 631, Soviet Section.))

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Internal Security Section and the Racial Intelligence Section.

- 1 - C. D. Brennan
- 1 - G. C. Moore
- 1 - M. E. Triplett
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - S. J. Papich

SJP:clb
(6)

Stops not warranted
on black extremists
at this time
J.D. 1/31/69

18 FEB 5 1969

DOWNED

STAFF

1 P. 1/31/69

5-11-69

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : W. A. Branigan

DATE: August 24, 1966

FROM : M. E. Triplett

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200

1 - W. A. Branigan
1 - A. P. Litrento

1 - S. Papich
1 - M. E. Triplett

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Wick _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

From 8-14-65 through 8-13-66, 3028 Hunter Reports transmitting 6077 items were received from (Bureau Informant 200). This is a slight increase (almost 3%) in number of items over the previous year.

Although items were received on a continuous basis, the number dropped during the period of August, 1965, through January, 1966. This is believed to be due to the reorganization, transfer of personnel and change in supervision over the

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

From February, 1966, to the present, there has been a marked increase in number of items received. The average for the past four months has been 627 per month, whereas the average for the same period last year was 421. There has been no significant change in the type of material except that more items are being received regarding subjects on whom the source has not furnished information previously, necessitating more research. The value of this material is shown by the fact that there was an increase of 53% in number of new cases opened on the basis of information furnished by the source.

Approximately 580 letters were written on information furnished by (Bureau Informant 200) during the past year. This is an increase of approximately 9% over those written the previous year. More than 260 new cases were opened and 96 cases were reopened. The majority of new cases were opened on the basis of travel to the (USSR) and contacts of U.S. citizens, Latin Americans and (Cubans) in the U.S. with individuals in the (USSR). Information was sent to the field to assist in pending investigations and for information. In some cases, data was extracted from several items, summarized and sent to the field in one communication under more than one caption to show relationships between various subjects.

An analysis of information received from the source during the past year is attached.

EX-110

REC 5

105-93089-78

ENCLOSURE

None. This is for your information. SEP 12 1966

--

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

I Traffic Which Holds No Interest:

- ## II Traffic of Specific Interest:

6. Data re [redacted];
[redacted]
[redacted]
- (c)(7);

7. Any data on Alfred S. Genger, telephone number [redacted]
[redacted] k City (file 1560), residence 1560 Grand Concourse.

8. Any traffic from or to U. S. Students in (Moscow) or to U. S. persons who were former students in (Moscow).

9. Any traffic between U. S. persons who are with a current exposition or a previous exposition in the (USSR).

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

DATE: 6/9/61

FROM : Mr. W. A. Branigan *WB*

(1 - W. C. Sullivan
1 - W. A. Branigan
1 - W. D. Stewart)

SUBJECT: (BUREAU INFORMANT 200) POLICY *Beatty*

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Ingram _____
Gandy _____

The purpose of this memo is to bring to your attention, as a matter of interest, the increase in the volume of [redacted] the additional administrative controls instituted to cope with increased volume, and lastly the desirable type of information (Bureau Informant 200) has been continually furnishing.

(Bureau Informant 200) is [redacted]

[redacted] informant originated in 1/58 and furnished 2/58. As of 6/6/61, we have received many reports transmitted as many as twelve items, and some reports transmitting up to twenty items. My memo to [redacted] 12/5/60 revealed as of that date 3425 Hunter Reports had been received. You may be interested to learn that in the last seven months we have received 1680 [redacted] or almost 50% of the number received from 2/58 until 12/60. On 3/9/61 CIA advised representatives of this Bureau that it had recently established a laboratory in New York City in connection with this project. This

A memo W. D. Stewart to W. A. Branigan 2/21/61 re captioned matter recommended and received approval for the utilization of a stamped notation on the front of the [redacted] permitting the interested supervisor to destroy contents of a [redacted] if found to be of no value after checking the appropriate block on the stamp indicating his reason for destroying same.

[redacted] if necessary, at a later date reproduce any Hunter Report. A memo from Mr. Belmont 3/3/61 to All Supervisors of the Espionage, Nationalities Intelligence, Internal Security and Subversive Control Sections instructed all recipients re use of above-mentioned stamp. In addition, above memo 2/21/61 received approval for a procedure whereby [redacted] would be screened for destruction by substantive desk handling captioned matter prior to sending these reports to Records Section for handling to preclude any indexing or handling which would later be deemed unnecessary if report is destroyed.

(105-93089).

REC-8

25 JUN 14 1961

Memo Branigan to Sullivan
Re: [BUREAU INFORMANT 200] POLICY
[105-93089]

A great deal of material furnished by the informant relates directly to contacts and activities of individuals who are of current interest to us, such as top level communists as William Z. Foster and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn and such espionage subjects as the Maurice Hyman Halperins, who were identified by Elizabeth Bentley, who stated Maurice Halperin was a source of Nathan Gregory Silvermaster. The Halperins are now in Russia. Pertinent information relating to individuals of current interest is passed to the field for its intelligence interest. In addition, material is received which reveals the (Soviet) sympathies of some U.S. citizens and also indicates certain arrangements with the (Soviets) which may be considered against the best interests of the U.S. Government. The larger amount of data received tends to confirm information already known and it does not require in itself that the field be advised of same.

The informant furnished two specific [redacted] reflecting that two different individuals were (sending post cards to USSR with another post card deliberately and carefully sealed to the first post card. In a case opened entitled "V. Podgoretsky, IS - R" (105-98499), the informant advised that both of the post cards forwarded by Podgoretsky contained a clandestine message on the inner side of the back post card. Investigations concerning James D. Cawthon, the former individual mentioned, and Podgoretsky are still in progress.)

Typical data furnished by (Bureau Informant 200) are set out below:

Information concerning travel plans abroad of several SM-C subjects; one namely, (Martin Field (101-1019)). Contacts in this country of Security Index (SI) subjects vacationing and studying abroad; namely, (Mary Lou Patterson (100-136466)). Data relating to a contact by (Bernon Ferguson Mitchell) with his mother in (California). As you recall, (Mitchell and William Hamilton Martin were employed at NSA a short time ago before they defected to Russia). Data that one (D. C. Mac Donald, Jr. of Brighton, Massachusetts) requested publishers of the (Soviet "Pravda") to forward to him old issues of that paper so he could distribute same to Americans in various cities here to improve their language skill and to acquaint them with the (USSR). Data concerning numerous individuals who sent New Years greetings to (Nikita Khrushchev) and expressed their sympathies toward (Soviet) way of life; namely, (Donald A. Sawtelle (105-15570)), a New York SI subject. Data revealing a contact by (John Peter Grothe (62-105833)) with the Minister of Culture in Moscow requesting this individual to promise the (Moiseyov) dancers would perform in U.S. and also indicating to him he expected to visit (USSR) again in the near future. (Grothe) advised him that last year

Memo Branigan to Sullivan
Re: [BUREAU INFORMANT 200] POLICY
[105-93089]

he worked for Senator (Hubert Humphrey) as a foreign relations advisor and did a lot of work in field of disarmament. He further indicated he was doing graduate work at Stanford but still served as a consultant to Senator (Humphrey). Bufiles reveal one (Victoria Ivanova Sandor (105-58070), a Russian born alien and her husband (John Sandor) who is presently employed as an attorney in the Office of the Attorney General, State of Minnesota, are close friends of Orville Freeman, former Governor of Minnesota and present Secretary of Agriculture, Washington, D. C. The informant advised recently in regard to (Victoria Sandor) that she advised her mother in (USSR) she expected to move to Washington where her husband will work for Secretary of Agriculture, Freeman; that she and her husband will be friends of Freeman and President Kennedy; and that she hopes through these connections she will be able to obtain a necessary permit for her mother to come to the U.S. She indicated she will go to the President, to his wife, or to whomever it will be necessary to achieve this goal.

Information received from (Bureau Informant 200) cannot be disseminated directly as it might tend to reveal this highly confidential source; however, the information is used to great advantage by the Bureau for its own intelligence at the Bureau and in the field. Investigations are opened on data furnished as above and if we can ascertain confirmation of same data from our sources in the field we can then appropriately disseminate pertinent information.

ACTION:

None, above data are furnished solely for your information.

(WDL) WAB
JH
BZ

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET**Memorandum**

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN

DATE: 8/21/61

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN

SUBJECT: ~~BUREAU INFORMANT 200~~ POLICY

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

CLASSIFIED BY SP7 [signature]
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 10/26/00

Reference is made to memorandum Stewart to Branigan 8/8/61 re same subject wherein it was requested a conference be arranged between Special Agents (Sam J. Papich, W. D. Stewart) and an interested [redacted] JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

On 8/17/61 Special Agents (Sam J. Papich, W. D. Stewart) [redacted] JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

The observations set out on pages 2, 3, and 4 of the referenced memorandum were individually discussed with the [redacted] They appeared very pleased with our analysis of the [redacted] material received and were also pleased with the attention afforded it. (Mr. Hunt), at the conclusion of the conference, requested we furnish a set of guides, similar to our afore-mentioned observations discussed, for his people. Attached is a blind memo for CIA setting forth material in which we have no interest and a specific interest. JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

In order to better understand the coverage of (Bureau Informant 200) the writer specifically asked the following questions and received the following answers:

1. Is the informant covering all traffic or selected traffic?

Answer: Approximately 500,000 items pass to and from each month. Approximately 200,000 items are screened. The other 300,000 escape screening because they pass through at hours when no one is on duty. Of the 200,000 items screened, approximately 1,200 items receive "close" scrutiny.

2. What portion of the informant's coverage are we getting?

Answer: Of the 1,200 items closely scrutinized, we are receiving approximately 250 to 300 monthly

REC-52

AUG 29 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SECRET

SECRET

Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan
Re: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 POLICY
105-93089

3. Why are we getting specific type traffic, i.e., Exchange Students, (Vladimir Kazakevich) material (Kazakevich) is a prolific letter writer now in (USSR) who was formerly a pro-(Soviet) economist-living in the U.S.), and (Intourist) traffic (general data re arrangements for Americans traveling to (Russia))? (S)

Answer: Exchange Student traffic ("Mother writes to son who is a (Soviet-bloc) exchange student in U.S. and sends family love" and vice versa. Letters are synopsisized and are of no interest as such) has been sent because CIA is surveying a certain area of traffic. (Mr. Hunt) advised they derived no intelligence benefit from their survey and was interested to learn of our similar results. In regard to (Kazakevich), CIA develops a great deal of foreign intelligence data from material he transmits and receives. (Mr. Hunt) felt material would be of interest to us. He was advised we have derived nothing to date from this material as we are solely interested in the individuals involved and in order to protect this highly sensitive informant we do not route the informant's material around for general intelligence interest. (Mr. Hunt) was advised all of the informant's material is handled on a strictly need-to-know basis and the material retained is under strict control. (Mr. Hunt) was pleased in regard to our secure precautions as only a very few CIA people have any knowledge of [redacted] In regard to (Intourist) traffic, (Mr. Hunt) advised we were furnished same because one of the individuals associated with an (Intourist) agency was suspected of being a (Soviet) intelligence contact. (Mr. Hunt) agreed with our observation that all Americans traveling abroad had to obtain a passport from State Department, such travel to the (USSR) being permissible, we could obtain any necessary data re an individual from State. (S) JEFK Act 6 (1) (b)

In regard to item number three above, it was agreed we would not receive any more [redacted] re Exchange Students, (Vladimir Kazakevich) (who alone provided 300 items in 1960) and (Intourist) traffic. In addition "holiday greeting" type traffic will not be furnished. Specific exceptions to the above-mentioned traffic we will not receive are set out in our blind memorandum to CIA and were set out in the referenced memorandum on pages 2 and 3. (S) JEFK Act 6 (1) (b)

SECRET

SECRET

Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan
Re: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 POLICY
105-93089

The matter of receipt of illegible material was also discussed and it was pointed out to (Mr. Hunt) no matter how important the contents may be if the name and address of the U.S. addressee or addressor is illegible the material is of no value. It was specifically requested more legible material be furnished and, if it was obvious reproduction would be poor, we would appreciate it if U.S. person's name and address could be printed or written out. (Mr. Hunt) advised they were aware of reproduction problem and stated Xerox equipment was to be installed in the near future. This, he believed, would help the problem.

In regard to the CIA Watch List, approximately 535 names now appear on this list which is supplemented each Monday morning. (Mr. Hunt) requested we specifically place on this list the individuals on whom we want coverage even though we are presently receiving items re these persons. If their names appear on the Watch List, we will possibly get closer coverage. Attached with the blind memorandum for CIA is a list of individuals presently on the Watch List which (Mr. Hunt) requested. Interested supervisors will be advised and additional names of Communist Party members now in (Soviet-bloc) countries will be furnished CIA via our Liaison Agent.

In regard to CIA's sampling of certain types of traffic and furnishing same to us, (Mr. Hunt) was requested to advise our Liaison Agent what it was doing and after a period of six months we would furnish the results of our observations which would dictate whether we would continue to receive this new type material.

(Mr. Hunt) desired that in regard to any correspondence with CIA wherein a reference is made to a [redacted] or the [redacted] in any way that the letter be sent via Liaison as [redacted]

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)
JFK Act 6 (1) (B)
JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

As pointed out in the referenced memorandum, the need for this conference was to insure the (Bureau Informant 200) Program will continue to operate under maximum economy and efficiency to the mutual interests of CIA and the Bureau. It is believed as a result of the above conference that the Hunter material now received will be reduced approximately 50%.

SECRET

SECRET

Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan
Re: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY.
105-93089

At the conclusion of the conference, (Mr. Hunt) and his aides who were obviously pleased with our observations requested a similar conference in approximately six months. (SA Stewart) will prepare an appropriate tickler in this regard and set same for 2/18/62, at which time a suitable memo will be prepared indicating observations which might be discussed and requesting permission to attend such a conference.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the three copies of the attached blind memorandum be furnished to CIA by our Liaison Agent as a guide to the traffic in which we have an interest. JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

(WDL) WMS

delivered to
CIA
8/23/61
WMS

SECRET

SECRET

1 - Stewart

August 21, 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE...

RE:



10/26/00
CLASSIFIED BY SP7A/MLK
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

After an extensive review of 5600 [redacted] transmitting innumerable items, we have made the following observations in the interest of economy in regard to [redacted] as it relates to our Bureau and your Agency to insure time will not be unnecessarily expended by our Bureau processing unwanted material and to save your Agency the expense of furnishing our Bureau this unwanted material.

I TRAFFIC WHICH HOLDS NO INTEREST:

- 1 - (Intourist) traffic (general data concerning arrangements for Americans traveling to Russia). Such travel is permissible and arrangements have been previously made through State Department for a passport. (S)
- 2 - Personal type letters, which have been translated into English, between the United States relatives, sweethearts, stamp collectors, and their (Russian) counterparts.
- 3 - Letters to and from Exchange Students, which again are synopsised in English and reveal that "Mother writes to son who is an Exchange Student in the United States and sends family's love," and vice versa. (S)
- 4 - No "holiday greeting" type traffic desired.

In regard to the above four categories, your Agency's laboratory processes [redacted]

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

us its observations concerning anyone of these appearing in the traffic.

II EXCEPTIONS TO THE ABOVE FOUR CATEGORIES:

- A. Any traffic in the above-mentioned nondesired categories wherein the translator feels there is some intelligence significance. Numerous letters have the translator's

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____

(WDS:ct)
(5) A

SECRET

SECRET

Project Hunter

comments indicating your Agency's Watch List shows the person is a suspected intelligence agent or that the text of the letter indicates some type of code,, et cetera.

- B. Any traffic wherein it is revealed United States addressee or addressor is a United States Government employee or is employed in a sensitive industry, i.e., missile field.
- C. Any traffic wherein we have an obvious intelligence interest such as an open offer by an individual to assist (Soviets), an indication an individual is going to (Russia) and wants to become a citizen or wherein any individual professes pro-(Soviet) or procommunist sympathies.

III WE ARE SPECIFICALLY INTERESTED IN:

- 1 - All traffic relating to top communists traveling abroad which we have been getting regularly and from which we have been extracting a great deal of intelligence data such as (Mary Lou Patterson, the Pittmans, William Z. Foster, Claude Lightfoot, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn) et cetera.
- 2 - All traffic on specific individuals we place on the Watch List.
- 3 - All traffic on special individuals such as NSA defectors (William Hamilton Martin and Bernon Ferguson Mitchell).
- 4 - All traffic of a clandestine type such as that in the (V. Podgoretsky) case.

IV

If possible, it would be appreciated if an effort could be made to furnish as legible a copy of Hunter material

SECRET

SECRET

Project Hunter

as possible. In particular, if it is evident paper from which copy is to be made is not type to give a good reproduction, it would be appreciated if a notation concerning name and address of United States recipient or sender could be made from original. Frequently, information of interest is received but United States person's name on reproduction is indistinguishable and information becomes of no value.

V LIST OF PERSON DESIRED ON THE WATCH LIST AS OF AUGUST 18, 1961

NAME

ADDRESS

BERLAND, MARK V.

Flat 15 Lasvinskaya St. 11
Perm 24, USSR

" FOSTER, WILLIAM Z.

Apartment 6B, 1040 Nelson
Avenue, Bronx, New York

HASKELL, ROY

12 Crown Street
Brooklyn, New York

KAHN, ALBERT EUGENE

1302 Henno Way,
Glen Ellen, California

KOVOLENKO, V. P.

General P. O.,
Kiev I, USSR

PECHTER, BERNARD DAVID

2161 Shattuck Avenue
Berkeley, California

ROBERTS, HOLLAND DEWITTE

383 Hadonia, Palo Alto,
California. During Week
Days - 787 Castro Street,
San Francisco, California

SUCHOBECK, ALEX (NMI)

1315 Lincoln Avenue,
Pacific Grove, California

SECRET

SECRET

Project Hunter

TRILUPAITIENE, ALDONA

131/14-1, Antakaenio Street
Vilnius, Lithuania

TRILUPAITIS, LEONAS
(also card on
Leonas Algeda)

Apartment 1B, 104 Irvington
Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C.

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 11/2/62

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Sullivan
1 - Branigan
1 - Stewart

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

CIA advised that its

coverage

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

This concentrated

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

coverage is for the purpose of determining if there is any illegal agent traffic.

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

to be reduced until after the Christmas mail rush has subsided.

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

They are very cooperative in that they are willing to focus their attention on any particular phase of coverage we suggest for our own benefit. For CIA's interest we furnished them a copy of the attached memorandum of our analysis of typical information furnished by (Bureau Informant 200) of interest to us.

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

ACTION:

None. Above data furnished for your information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2AM/ly

WDS:jes
(4)

(105-93089)

Enclosure

REC-35

7 NOV 5 1962

EX-118

65 NOV 9 1962

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 ~~Sullivan~~1 ~~Branigan~~1 ~~Bland~~1 ~~Baumgartner~~1 ~~Donahoe~~1 ~~Stewart~~

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 8-25-61

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 POLICY

On 8-17-61, a conference took place between Special Agents (Sam J. Papich, W. D. Stewart) and representatives of CIA in regard to (Bureau Informant 200). As a result, [] was recently furnished a guide as to Bureau Informant material we desire. This guide was prepared after discussion with several members of the Espionage, Nationalities Intelligence, Subversive Control, and Internal Security Sections. In addition, [] was furnished a current list of names previously placed on the [] Watch List by us. In this regard, the CIA representative advised that, although we are getting coverage on certain individuals, to insure we get complete coverage on each individual we desire it on, they should be specifically added to the Watch List. This Watch List is revised each Monday; therefore, any person not included on this list at present can be included by forwarding a routing slip anytime to (W. D. Stewart, Room 644 RB) bearing the individual's name, his address in U.S., and indicating the period coverage is desired. A list will be compiled by (Mr. Stewart) weekly and furnished to CIA via liaison. []

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

RECOMMENDATION:

REC-47

(105-93089-32)

That the above information be discussed at the next conference held by the Espionage, Nationalities Intelligence, Subversive Control, and the Internal Security Sections and that all agents in the above-mentioned sections be reminded to furnish (Mr. Stewart) a copy of any letter prepared from Bureau Informant 200 material to assist him in continually evaluating the program.

(WDS:ekg) (7)

(105-93089)

(WDS)

WAS

done as of 9/1/61
 Ruben
 Chief
 Section Chiefs Conf
 5- (WDS)

10/30/62

RE: BUREAU INFORMANT 200

Typical data furnished by (Bureau Informant 200):

Information indicating travel plans to the (USSR) of numerous Communist Party subjects; data indicating pro-Soviet sympathies of U. S. individuals; data indicating a U. S. person may be serving as a (Soviet) courier; data indicating the existence of particular (Russian) social and art clubs in the U. S.; data indicating a desire of U. S. students to study in (USSR); data indicating pro-Castro sympathies of U. S. persons; data revealing present activity, feelings, and former associates of (Bernon Ferguson Mitchell and William Hamilton Martin, recent National Security Agency (NSA) defectors; data revealing U. S. military personnel are in contact with official establishments and/or individuals in (USSR); data revealing activities of the (Maurice Hyman Halperins), now residing in (Cuba), and of their son (David Carlos Halperin, a medical student at the University of Chicago) and data indicating current whereabouts of (Carl and Alice Jerome) Communist Party subjects; and data relating to the current whereabouts of (James M. McMillin, Jr., a former U. S. soldier attached to U. S. Embassy, Moscow, Russia, who previously defected and married a Soviet).

Data of Special Interest:

During the present (Cuban) crisis, we have identified several pro-Castro sympathizers in U. S. through their contacts with (Cubans) at (Friendship University, Moscow) and have been alerted to their activity. We have learned that (Russian) school authorities are greatly displeased with (Huldah S. Clark, daughter of Negro Communist Party subject William Clark of Newark), because of her behavior. She too evidenced discontentment there. Her educational trip to (USSR) served as CP propaganda. We were alerted to (Maurice Halperins) intended return to U. S. We have been advised of (Lillie Mae Teslich's) intended visit to (USSR). Her daughter in (Moscow) is suspected as being the propaganda-radio announcer ("Moscow Molly.") We are developing U. S. contacts of (Helen Kagen-Pozner, UN) employee discharged in 1950's for failure to answer questions re possible espionage involvement, through correspondence of her with relatives in (Russia).

(105-93089-54)

such as (Valeriy Tereshchenko). One of (Tereshchenko's) contacts is believed to be a target for contact by (KGB) and another is the son-in-law of the woman in whose apartment (Viktor Krauchenko) had been visiting. (Krauchenko) is a (Soviet) defector who recently committed suicide. The informant has advised of the activities and contacts of (Vladislav Krasnow, Soviet) defector to Sweden in 1962. The Bureau was not aware previously that (Krasnow) was in the U.S.

Although much material regarding communists and the Communist Party (CP) is also received from other sources, the informant continues to furnish additional details and new information regarding changes of employment and residence, travel, contacts and activities. Data regarding attempts of the DuBois Clubs to expand nationally and internationally was furnished in items on (Paula Garb) International Secretary, who went to the (USSR) to marry a (Soviet) if he can obtain a divorce. Items pertaining to (Mary Lou Camacho) (daughter of CP leader) told of the birth of her daughter, reconciliation with her (Cuban) husband, plans to go to Cuba to live and that one of her friends, a Security Index subject, was in Ghana when she was believed to be in the U.S.

Data is received regarding travel and contacts of (Mary Rakoczy) (widow of suspected espionage agent), who attended the (Higher Party School of the Ukraine in Kiev, USSR). Information continues to be received regarding her son, (Andrew Rakoczy), who was allegedly studying ballet but actually attended the above school for almost two years. This has included his contacts, change of employment and residence and racial, poverty and Progressive Labor Party activities in Chicago. One of his contacts now at this school has been identified as (Teddie Kardash), son of Canadian communists. The source has also advised that (Irene Rakoczy) and three unidentified individuals plan to study dancing in (Kiev) this summer (possibly at the above-mentioned school which maintains a special section to combine lessons in dancing and indoctrination) and that (Bernard Francis Taylor) (son of CP official), who went to the (USSR) with a musical and dancing group, remained in (Kiev) to attend school. (Don Zurilko), son of the alien wife of a U.S. citizen residing in State of Washington, is attending school in (Kiev). He is believed to be from the U.S. or Canada.

Additional information is received regarding persons involved in the peace movements, anti-Vietnam demonstrations, women's organizations, "teach-ins" (one has been in contact with a (GRU) officer), racial matters, Progressive Labor Party, Students for a Democratic Society, DuBois Clubs, Students Non-Violent Coordinating Committee and other organizations. Items reveal names of U.S. contacts with members of such (Soviet) propaganda organizations as the (Soviet Peace Committee, Soviet Women's Committee, Committee For Return to the Homeland) and others.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 27, 1963

FROM : W. R. Wannall *WRW/pca*

SUBJECT: (BUREAU INFORMANT 200) - POLICY

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. Sullivan
 1 - Mr. Wannall
 1 - Mr. Branigan
 1 - Mr. Stewart
 1 - Liaison
 1 - Mr. Harrell

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

During the period the coverage was in effect, we received 94 items and opened 15 new cases based on the material. While no specific data was developed indicating clandestine messages were being transmitted, we know that one of the illegal (Cuban) agent networks has plans for mail drops in the New York City area, and this coverage could conceivably lead us to these drops in the future. We have

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

we should do so in this instance.

ACTION:

If you approve, the attached memorandum containing a summary of the action taken by us as a result of the

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

Enclosure

(105-93089)

(RAM:djw)
(8)

ENCLOSURE

REC-52

EX-102

17 APR 3 1963

UNRECORDED COPY FILED

Transmitted to [unclear]
 Hunt/CM-3/29/63

SECRET

INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM (BUREAU INFORMANT 200)

Data received regarding the following current and former double agents and sources has been utilized to evaluate their reliability: (Luke Chia Liu Yuan; [Pedro Celestino Jimenez Moreno] Gordon Philip Polley; Hugo Rodriguez-Ramirez; Julius (S) Shell; [NH 445-S]; Phyllis Oja; Samuel Jaffe; [NY 2911-S; NY 3556-S; CG 6562-S]; Mr. and Mrs. George R. Atkins; and Boris I. Oblesow) (S). The field has been advised of individuals in close contact with (Soviets) with the request to consider for development as sources.

Information regarding (Soviet) exchange students (eight are (KGB) agents) includes names of associates, activities, travel, types of material requested to obtain and individuals with whom they continue to maintain contact after they leave the U.S. Similar information is furnished regarding other (Soviets) in the U.S. as a result of the exchange program. Material is also furnished regarding U.S. citizens who travel to the (USSR) as part of the exchange.

Data regarding current and former U.S. exchange students shows (Soviet) and U.S. contacts before and after return, romantic involvements, sympathies and difficulties encountered in (Russia). A former exchange student has been in contact with a suspected espionage agent regarding (Ralph Matlaw) (according to (Nosenko), the (KGB) was to attempt recruitment of (Matlaw)). The source has revealed former exchange student (Michael Cole's) travel plans and continued contacts with (Soviets) (one is son of an espionage agent) and (Henry Huttenbach's) attempts to obtain a divorce in order to marry a (Soviet) girl. Similar information is furnished regarding U.S. citizens who are, or have been, in (Russia) but are not under the exchange program. These include (Sally Harris, Natasha Kent, Kathy Boudin and Alexander Nikolauk). Two of the four U.S. citizens who have applied for entrance to (Soviet) universities have stated that they desire to become (Soviet) citizens. (Milagros Ruiz Aponte, Puerto Rican nationalist in the USSR) is using an alias in her correspondence. Another (Puerto Rican) went to (Cuba) before he left for the (USSR).

Material has been received regarding three employees of USIA, two U.S. citizens employed by the UN, a Federal employee who intends to marry a (Soviet) girl, three individuals involved with (Soviet) women and two U.S. contacts of (Galina Smirnova (an Intourist guide) who has compromised Americans in the past).

Contacts of foreign exchange students and aliens in the U.S. from (Canada, Peru, Cuba, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Mexico, Chile, Haiti, Italy, France, Iraq and Africa) with their friends in the (USSR) who are studying at (Friendship) University or other schools show that

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they may be communists. Two foreign students and an exile from (Haiti) have been acting as intermediaries. Several have applied for admittance to (Friendship) University and other schools in the (USSR) because of finances or ideology. A (Nicaraguan) Marxist in the U.S. is acting as an intermediary for an individual at (Friendship) University by forwarding mail to (Bolivia). Data is furnished regarding foreign students who attended school in the (USSR) and are now in the U.S. One of these appears to have been compromised before he left (Russia) and another brought his (Soviet) wife to the U.S.

Items are received regarding (Soviets) who have entered the U.S. as wives of Americans: (Victoria Sandor (now a Federal employee); Ala Anderson; Ludmila Olsen) who has advised that she was approached by (Soviet) Intelligence when in the (USSR) in 1965; (Irina Horwitz; Nataliya Konigsford; and Rosita Brayton) wife of an (Alaskan) politician and newspaperman, who has become involved with a (Russian) born U.S. Army Captain. The source advised of contacts, travel and study in the (USSR) of Mrs. Kemp Tolley, (Soviet) wife of former U.S. Naval Attache, who has admitted furnishing information regarding Americans to the (Soviets) in the 1940's.

Much material has been furnished regarding U.S. citizens' travel plans, including those of known subversives, their (Soviet) relatives and contacts and difficulties encountered by two tourists with (Soviet) authorities. Data has been received regarding (Soviets) and former U.S. citizens who have traveled, or intend to travel, to the U.S., their contacts, activities and relatives. Several had renounced their U.S. citizenship and had been engaged in questionable activities in the past. (Mary Mackler), who recently returned to the U.S., has had numerous contacts with known subversives, at least two of whom were connected with espionage in the past. Material is received on U.S. defectors now in the (USSR).

Additional information received includes: plans of seven individuals to repatriate to the (USSR); U.S. contacts with current and former known and suspected (Soviet) agents now in the (USSR) (Vladimir Sossinskiy, Vladimir Pozner, Eugenia Olkhina, Leonids Rimjans, Vladimir Paramonov, Igor Melekh) and others); activities and contacts of current and former known and suspected espionage agents now in the U.S. (Aaron Pressman, Josef Zarovich, Victor Perlo, Helen Pozner Wilga) and others); the death of (Georgi Lieb) (suspected of working as black market currency operator for (KGB) and continuation of his contacts by his wife; activities of (Kirill Alexeev) (suspect in (Umbel) case) family; (Soviet) contacts of (Gerard Piel) who has been in contact with a (KGB) officer; (Soviet) contacts and travel of (D. G. Brennan) who, according to (Fedora), was to be approached by (KGB); contacts of (Olga Yourkevitch) (widow of ship designer) with (KGB) agent, travel to (USSR) as a guest of organization to receive her husband's archives and her illness in the (USSR); contact of (Major Abdel Okeil of United Arab Republic) who was attending the (FBI-National Academy) with individual in the (USSR); U.S. contacts of several defectors and (Soviet) repatriates,